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I want first to say thank you: to all of you, to Chicago-Kent, to Dean
Hal Krent, and especially to Dan Hamilton for putting this together. I am
overwhelmed-more overwhelmed than decorum permits me to reveal
while standing here.
Let me start by saying a few words about the structure of the book. I
began with an idea I discovered while doing research on colonial and revo-
lutionary America. The thin version of this idea, which I labeled "popular
constitutionalism," is simply that the community controls the interpretation
as well as the making of constitutional law, and does so in a meaningful
sense. We need a thicker version, of course, but any thicker is a matter of
how the thin version is instantiated and made real to the relevant commu-
nity. That changed over time, and the history in the book was meant to
show how this thin idea retained its vibrancy in constantly changing politi-
cal, social, legal, and economic circumstances. The book is not meant to be
a story of declension, and I don't think of myself as telling either about the
rise or about the fall of something. I want, rather, to show that there has
been an ongoing debate about popular constitutionalism throughout Ameri-
can history.
The idea changes over time, of course. Popular constitutionalism in
1800 is not the same as it was in 1765; nor is it the same in 1840 as it was
in 1800. The core idea remains unchanged: that the community exercises
active control over the interpretation of its Constitution. But the means by
which the community understands itself to exercise that control are quite
different. The main development is a shift from direct to indirect means:
from juries, petitions, mobs, and the like, to acts of representatives in the
government itself. You can have direct control when (but only when) eve-
rything happens at the local level in small communities. This ceases to
work, as our Founders discovered, once you create a national polity and a
national government.
Put another way, the major development in the Early Republic is the
move to some form of mediated popular constitutionalism. The community
(meaning the popular political culture) still has a story about how it re-
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mains "in control," but it's a different story, as control is now asserted
through formal government institutions that act for us and on our behalf.
Instead of organizing boycotts or torching warehouses to block the en-
forcement of unconstitutional laws, we look to our representatives in gov-
ernment and, later, to political parties to act for us in getting offending
legislation repealed or undone.
I tried in The People Themselves to describe this historical evolution
in detail through approximately 1840, the point at which a modern party
system is fully formed. After that, as many people have noted (both here
and elsewhere), I moved quickly to the present day, in a short chapter of
only twenty pages. This was partly a matter of space and time: it took me
ten years to do the research and 240 pages to tell the story up to 1840 in a
way I regarded as thorough, and the book was already longer than I or any-
body else wanted it to be. But, more, my hope was that other people would
pick up the storyline and carry it forward. My short survey of the period
between 1840 and 1995 was meant merely to suggest that there was most
definitely a story to be told. And while some reviewers have criticized me
for not telling that story myself, a number of scholars have taken up the
invitation. Nothing, I should say, could be more gratifying, and this is pre-
cisely the kind of work I hoped would be produced by historians who know
the later periods of American history better than me. They have begun to
fill in and complicate the story.
The book has a point, of course, and it is meant to speak directly to
and about today's debates. I'm bemused when historians criticize me (or
each other) for being presentist. Historians are all and always presentist.
Why else did the field suddenly grow obsessed with questions of race and
slavery in the 1950s? Why else did historians suddenly begin looking at
colonial era mobs in the late 1960s and early 1970s? The questions histori-
ans ask are invariably driven by the present. And much as they claim to be
doing history without regard for present controversies, their views about
those controversies are seldom hidden or difficult to discern. I just wanted
to be a little more honest about it, to come right out and lay out the his-
tory's implications for current controversies. Because there are implications
and they need to be considered.
So Chris Tomlins is right that my book is an example of "committed
history."' But its commitments flowed from and emerged out of my his-
torical research, rather than preceding it. I started with conventional views
and a different project, and I was originally planning simply to record the
1. See Christopher Tomlins, Politics, Police, Past and Present: Larry Kramer's The People
Themselves, 81 CHI.-KENr L. REV. 1007 (2006).
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early understandings of federalism. As I became familiar with the founding
era, however, I discovered a world that was very different from the one I
had been taught to expect. And not only different, but also (I thought) at-
tractive in many respects, particularly in its understanding of and commit-
ment to popular government. So while the book is about history, it's not
meant to be just a history book. I want historians to read it, and I hope it
changes some of what they think (by showing how the Founding was less
reactionary and more consistent with the Revolution than conventional
wisdom now holds). But the book is also meant to be performative. It is
meant to be a part of a current debate. It's meant to help restore and rein-
vigorate an idea that emerges from the history but that I think is a good idea
and an important idea and an idea that ought to be relevant to us still.
I want next to turn briefly to the constitutional theory described in the
book. For notwithstanding what some reviewers have said, there is a theory
embedded in the narrative, and it is "departmentalism." To explain what
this means, albeit briefly, we need to make two assumptions that I think
must be taken as given if we're going to talk sensibly about the something
like popular constitutionalism. One is that "the people" cannot act in an
unmediated fashion on the national political stage. It's not worth even talk-
ing about a notion of unmediated popular constitutionalism. It just can't
happen. We're too big, we're too diverse. Direct democracy can exist in a
meaningful fashion only in tiny communities. Popular constitutionalism on
any larger scale must take place through some set of mediating institutions.
Nothing in the book looks back (romantically or otherwise) to the colonial
era of direct action. Mobs were fine in their context and in their time, but
no one, least of all me, is suggesting that this is a good way to go about
doing things today.
Second, any mediation must ultimately be done through formal insti-
tutions of government. This doesn't necessarily mean the three branches of
the federal government, but it does mean government structures of some
sort. These formal institutions need not be the sole mediating device. To be
sure, Jefferson and Madison thought otherwise. They wanted only the
branches of government to mediate. But this simple model of departmenta-
lism could not last, if it ever really existed at all. There are, or can be, a
myriad of additional mediating institutions: political parties, unions, public
interest organizations, chambers of commerce, and the like. At the end of
the day, however, these unofficial mediating institutions must still work
through the formal institutions of government, which provide the final test
for any expression of popular will and popular constitutionalism. The
measure of acceptance of an interpretation of the Constitution, in other
2006]
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words, is always and necessarily found in some form of government action
or inaction (whether as legislation, judicial review, or executive behavior of
some sort) and popular reactions to it.
With these assumptions in mind, the question to ask is this: if the rele-
vant polity has become complex and extensive, how can you engineer a
system of popular control over constitutional interpretation? Madison put
the question succinctly in The Federalist No. 10, when he referred to the
need to find "a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republi-
can government? ' 2 And note that first "republican," which is too often
overlooked. Not just any remedy will do, Madison says. It must be a repub-
lican remedy, which in today's idiom means a democratic remedy. What
can we do, in other words, to find a democratic solution to the problems
inherent in democracy itself? One thing is clear. Judicial supremacy is not
such a solution. Or, at least, it was not such a solution to Madison or Jeffer-
son or most Americans in the Early Republic. The Constitution was law
made by the people to govern their governors. It reflected their highest
aspirations for the rule of law. The notion that responsibility for interpret-
ing this precious document could or should be lodged in an institution not
responsible to the people was simply unthinkable, utterly anathema to the
core commitments of the American Revolution and the central premise of
republican government.
So what was the solution? This was something Americans have ar-
gued and fought about from the beginning. For myself, and together with a
substantial majority of Americans in the Early Republic, I like Madison's
and Jefferson's solution, which went something like this: Create a govern-
ment that has a multiplicity of politically accountable institutions, with
different levels (state and federal) and different branches at each level (sen-
ates and houses and executives). These branches and departments of gov-
ernment should all be responsive and responsible to the people. But they
should also all be to some extent separate from and independent of each
other, and they should all be able to act in different ways to impede or ob-
struct one another. If all these politically accountable institutions then agree
on the constitutionality of a measure of government, that's as close as
we're ever going to come to knowing that the measure has the kind of
popular support that must ultimately decide. And I mean not just that the
measure is popular. I mean that it has the right kind of popularity: that it is
a product of a reasonable and reasoned popular will.
The idea is really quite brilliant. On the one hand, all these different
entities are responsible and responsive to the public. On the other hand,
2. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 65 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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they are responsible and responsive in different ways and to different parts
of the public. Members of the House are directly responsive to constituents,
but only within a relatively small, geographically concentrated portion of a
state; Senators were originally responsive only indirectly but to an entire
state; the President is responsive to the nation as a whole. And so on. Rep-
resentation in state and local governments is similarly complicated and
redundant. The result is a bewildering system of overlapping polities and
overlapping and competing political incentives, with politicians in a variety
of situations attempting to lead and to follow the same constituents. If rep-
resentatives in one branch are unresponsive or corrupted, people who are
concerned may turn to another branch or another level of government. If
representatives in one branch make a bad decision, representatives in an-
other can use opposition to the decision to advance their own popularity
and political agenda. This is what Madison meant in The Federalist No. 51
when he said that "[t]he interest of the man must be connected with the
constitutional rights of the place."'3 Because the branches (or rather the
politicians who constitute them) are constantly competing for public favor,
we can use them to generate a productive public deliberation.
To illustrate: Suppose the House passes a bill. Enacting this bill pre-
sumably reflects the Representatives' judgment that a law to this effect
would be desirable and is constitutional and thus something their constitu-
ents will like and approve. The bill goes to the Senate. Suppose the Sena-
tors (or a majority of them) disagree; they think either that the bill is bad
policy or that it is unconstitutional. They refuse to pass it. Does that end the
debate? Absolutely not. The function of checks and balances is not to end
deliberation, but to begin it. The Senate's refusal to enact the bill is meant
to induce the Representatives to go back to their constituents and say, "Put
pressure on those guys! Make them back off' It's a good bill, it's constitu-
tional, we should have this." The Senators, in the meantime, are not sitting
idly by doing nothing. They are presumably making the same sorts of ap-
peals, addressing constituents to explain why their view of the proposed
law makes more sense. This is how Madison conceived of deliberative
democracy. He did not want to create a legislature that would deliberate for
us. He wanted to create incentives for governing officials to foster and lead
a public debate.
We need to emphasize the verb "lead" in that last sentence. Govern-
ment officials were meant to be more than ciphers, and Madison's theory of
representation reserved an important role for leadership. It mattered to
Madison that elected officials be men of talent and education and higher
3. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 349.
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than average intelligence. Those in government are supposed to know
more. It's their job to think about policy, to learn the issues and complexi-
ties, to come up with solutions. But not to rule for us or over us. To debate
with us (and each other). To ensure that the pertinent issues and arguments
are properly aired and considered. When disagreements within government
arise, elected officials are supposed to use their knowledge and experience
to educate us, so we can decide based on reason and information. The pub-
lic is thus exposed to the arguments on each side of an issue, and the repre-
sentative nature of our government ensures that the public will actually
decide. For at some point, having heard the arguments from proponents and
opponents of the action in question, the public will settle on a view-at
which point any stalemate will end and an outcome be determined. If the
public backs the House, the Senate will yield and enact the law; if not, the
law will die. But precisely because our government is responsive, the final
decision will lie with the public. And because of the government's compli-
cated structure, the public that eventually decides is more likely to be in-
formed and acting on the basis of reason.
Nor does the process end in Congress. If the bill gets through both
houses of the legislature, it still must get past the President, who may veto
it, thus triggering another round of public deliberation. By creating a com-
plex government, in other words, we created multiple checkpoints, each
staffed by people with slightly different political incentives. This, in turn,
ensures that if grounds to question a law exist, they will almost certainly be
raised. And, as a result, we get the kind of public debate necessary to pro-
duce a responsible public opinion, which must be the governing voice in a
democracy. (This, by the way, is a central point in Ted Ruger's paper, 4
which makes exactly this sort of argument for the role of states in federal-
ism.)
Madison lays out this theory of deliberative democracy in The Feder-
alist No. 51. Interestingly, he never once mentions courts. The reason, I
think, is that Madison did not see courts playing a particularly significant
role in securing popular control of the government and the Constitution, at
least not in the late 1780s. When it came to these problems, his focus was
on politically accountable entities: the House, the Senate, the President, and
their counterparts at the state level. Within a relatively short time, however,
it became apparent that courts might have a role to play after all when it
came to questions of the constitutionality of government action. How and
why this idea emerged is described in chapters 2-5, as are the conceptual
4. See Theodore W. Ruger, Preempting the People: The Judicial Role in Regulatory Concur-
rency and Its Implications for Popular Lawmaking, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1029 (2006).
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moves that were needed to fold courts into the theory of departmentalism
and deliberative democracy. Alongside the other branches, courts became a
possible checkpoint: one more institution in which questions could be
raised to throw problems back to the public for further discussion or delib-
eration.
Including courts added a new wrinkle, however. For if courts were to
have this voice, we would need a way to control them, just as we control
the other branches or departments of government. The process wouldn't
work otherwise. The remedy would cease to be republican because the
Constitution would cease to be subject to popular control. But how do you
control courts, when judges are not elected? How do you control a branch
that has been structured to be immune from political pressure?
Those who wrote today's European constitutions found one solution to
this problem. In the constitutions adopted after WWII, the peoples of
Europe cleverly structured their judiciaries to secure both independence
and popular control. They did this by making their constitutional courts
formally independent, but giving the judges who sit on them limited terms
with staggering their appointments to ensure a regular turnover. To make
sure that extreme views would not come to dominate, they further required
these appointments to be approved by supermajorities in the legislature,
thus ensuring that judges have broad political support. And, just in case,
they made their constitutions relatively easy to amend. Power to pass on the
constitutionality of legislation is not a problem in a system like this, be-
cause there is little or no likelihood that a constitutional court will depart
from strongly help public views.
The problem is that no one had yet imagined anything remotely like
modern judicial review when our Constitution was written. Worried mainly
about direct executive or legislative interference in ordinary cases, espe-
cially criminal cases, we made our judges independent without the sort of
compensating structural checks to secure broad popular control that one
might want to include were courts to play an important role in defining the
Constitution. As a result, when judicial review did emerge-when the idea
grew that judges might have a say over the Constitution equal to that of the
other branches-we confronted a problem. How could or should we control
courts to ensure that they were equally accountable to and ultimately con-
trolled by the authoritative voice of the community?
A minority in the Early Republic said we could not. Judicial inde-
pendence, they said, required leaving courts with supremacy over the
meaning of fundamental law. But most Americans found that solution un-
acceptable. Instead, they cobbled together a set of political responses to
2006]
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control courts: responses that are undeniably cruder than those embodied in
modem constitutions but the best they could come up with under the cir-
cumstances. They fired judges. They abolished courts and cut their budgets
and slashed their jurisdiction and did all the things that we're told today we
cannot and must not do. Fortunately, and for reasons I believe are built into
our political system, they did these things rarely, and only after foolish
provocation by judges who refused to pay attention. A political equilibrium
emerged based on a potential threat that seldom needed to be used. Such is
our system, then, a system that has, in my view, worked tolerably well
across American history.
I am not opposed to judicial review, and it's important to realize that.
My goal is simpler: to shear off judicial supremacy from judicial review
and thus restore a true departmental system. Judges have a useful and sen-
sible voice when it comes to questions of constitutionality. But if the sys-
tem is to remain republican, we need something to control the courts,
something more than hoping we can persuade them to change their minds
or waiting to change their membership when one of them finally gets tired
of the job or dies. Given my druthers, I would amend our Constitution and
restructure the judiciary along the lines established by the Europeans. But
insofar as that is not likely to happen, I prefer our homegrown system of
crude control to nothing at all.
Does it really matter? Mort Horwitz raised this question in his keynote
address. 5 As Madison himself observed (in a letter I quoted several times in
the book), courts are going to have the final say most of the time anyway:
they come last in order, and few issues are going to be politically salient
enough for Congress or the President to mount a successful attack. (Just ask
Tom Delay and Bill Frist.) People don't like it when politicians attack
courts, and for good reasons, both normative and cultural. Which is why I
find the Chicken Little reactions to my book ridiculous; justice as we know
it will not end if we say it is okay today to do the sorts of things advocated
or done by, among others, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and both Roosevelts
in the past. The country got by for 170 years without judicial supremacy.
Courts are pretty robust institutions.
As suggested above, we need to think about the relationship of courts
to the other branches in terms of a political equilibrium. The Court's ability
to act, to decide cases and have its decisions enforced, is very much de-
pendent on other actors, including not just politicians but also the general
public. These other actors all have views about judicial authority, which
5. See Morton J. Horwitz, A Historiography of The People Themselves and Popular Constitu-
tionalism, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 813 (2006).
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affects what they do and when and how they choose to accept what the
Court does. Everyone in the system-the judges, political leaders, ordinary
citizens-reacts based partly on perceptions of whether a decisions is right
or wrong but also partly on views about who has what authority. People
who disagree with a decision may still accept it if they understand it to be
within the role reserved by our Constitution for the independent judiciary.
There will, at the same time, always be a point too far: a point at which the
disagreement is strong enough to trigger a reaction. But where that tipping
point is located, how far the Court can go before a political response
emerges, will vary depending on the extent to which people believe they
are supposed to defer to courts and judges. Wherever the point is, in any
event, the Court is going to respect it-meaning that once the point is es-
tablished, it will be rare that the Justices do anything to get themselves into
serious political trouble.
The question thus becomes: What is the Court's perception of its lim-
its, and what are the perceptions of other actors as to the Court's limits?
The existence or not of judicial supremacy is not likely to affect much the
frequency with which the Court is attacked. Rather, it simply changes the
equilibrium point. With judicial supremacy, the equilibrium is shifted so as
to allow the Court to do things that it wouldn't and couldn't do (because it
couldn't get away with them) without that authority.
A final point: Popular constitutionalism, as I conceptualize it, isn't
something that can or should be cabined by fixed rules of recognition. The
whole point is to leave this open-ended, to let politics find its own way of
expressing popular understandings about the Constitution, whether through
petitions or political parties, whether by packing the Court or by seeking to
amend the text. Does that make the Constitution what people say it is and
nothing more? Does it render the concept "constitutional" meaningless? I
think not, because any openness is actually quite limited due to practical
constraints imposed by the psychology of path dependency and the need to
persuade others.
Few of us can break completely free from the intellectual framework
we've inherited for determining what is or isn't constitutional; even if a
handful of prophets can do so, arguments that are too far outside the box
will not persuade others. We are unavoidably a participant in an existing
constitutional culture. What makes an argument persuasive or not as a con-
stitutional claim will inevitably grow out of some existing understanding
about what is or is not constitutional. There is room for change. That's
what makes our Constitution good and worthwhile. But it's not as though
anything and everything is up for grabs and there is no law here.
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Still, the range of possibilities opened up by popular constitutionalism
can be scary. Things can go wrong. The public can embrace ideas that are
horrible or immoral. So can judges, of course, or any elite or oligarch. But,
to reiterate a point often made, what defines progressives as progressives is
that they have faith in the ultimate common sense of the greater public.
This should not be misunderstood as some romantic idealization of democ-
racy and the noble yeoman. As Madison understood full well, courageous
leadership is critical, and we need institutions from which that leadership
can educate, inform, and help guide the formation of public opinion. For
most of American history, the critical institution serving these purposes
was the political party. Unfortunately, we spent much of the twentieth cen-
tury blaming political parties for everything that was wrong with politics,
and in doing so we badly weakened the critical institution that made poli-
tics work. If there is an agenda for constitutionalism today, its first concern
is not substantive. It is institutional. We should not say "popular constitu-
tionalism can't work, so turn the Constitution over to the Court." We
should, rather, be asking what kind of institutions we can construct to make
popular constitutionalism work, because we need new ones. We need to
start rethinking and building institutions that can make democratic constitu-
tionalism possible. And we need to start doing so now.
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